This text was originally drafted as a thesis in the European Joint Master's Program on Strategic Border Management.
1. Introduction
I decided to choose the United States Coast Guard's (USCG) Arctic Strategy as the subject of my report because it touches upon fields that I either have prior knowledge of or that I have personal interest in. Had the European Coast Guard Functions Forum (ECGFF) already had a strategy document, it would have been a more natural choice, but since the organization is in its infancy, no such paper exists. The topic selection is also intended to serve my longer term goal to build up the knowledge base on Coast Guard authorities around the world and to possibly contribute towards the ECGFF strategy development in my Master's Dissertation. The USCG was a natural starting point, since it is inarguably the leading Coast Guard authority in the world with unrivaled resources, presence and scope of activities. And, arguably, the USCG is something the ECGFF (or its successor organizations) might aspire to become sometime in the future.
In addition to an overall strategy, the USCG has a number of (sub-)strategies with either a geographical or a thematic scope. One of these is the Arctic Strategy that was published in 2013 in response to the rising geopolitical significance of the Arctic region. The Arctic Strategy briefly describes the current overall geo-strategic framework in the Arctic and the USCG's position within this framework. Effort is put into emphasizing why the Arctic matters by bringing up statistics about the rise in various types of maritime activity in the Arctic, its assessed extensive latent hydrocarbon and mineral resources and the effects of climate change on both of the above. Some geographical features and environmental factors attesting to the vastness, remoteness and inhospitality of the Arctic are also highlighted. The strategy outlines three Strategic Objectives for the USCG in the Arctic: Improving Awareness, Modernizing Governance and Broadening Partnerships. All of these are divided into sub-objectives and sub-sub-objectives, some of which are measurable and others more abstract. The USCG's mission is described in the document on a general level and it is tailored into the Arctic operational environment. A detailed description of the organization in the future is included and it is condensed into a single sentence that constitutes the USCG vision for operating in the Arctic region:
"Ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic."
In line with the tasking order, this report pursues to (1) briefly introduce the reader to the USCG Arctic Strategy, (2) to evaluate the Arctic Strategy in light of the theoretical framework of strategic planning and (3) to present some aspects towards the implementation of the objectives set in the strategy. Because of the strict limitations to the extent and in the timeframe available, a detailed discussion on any of the aforementioned topics is outside the scope of this report. However, recommendations are made for further research and elaboration on the topic.
2. Evaluation of the USCG Arctic Strategy
No strategy is right or wrong as such, but all of them are located somewhere along the continuum where the opposite ends consist of successful and non-successful elements. Moreover, all strategies are relative to time, place and the characteristics of the organization in question and its operating environment. Also, various strategies can be applied to achieve the same goals and these strategies might work equally well in achieving those goals. Therefore it might be argued that strategies can only be accurately evaluated after the fact, by backtracking from the end result. But this is not true either since other factors (such as luck, resources, implementation, etc.) than just strategy are in play to define the ultimate success or failure.
It can be argued that for public organizations, strategy evaluation is even more difficult than it is for private companies because the ultimate success is harder to measure. While private companies' only reason for existence (or at least the lowest common denominator) is to create added value for their shareholders; public organizations provide something less tangible - often dubbed as public value. The cash flow of a shareholder can be measured in absolute terms, while public value is more abstract. For example, the statutory missions of the USCG (appendix 1) include items like: marine safety, ice operations and defense readiness. It is clear that success in such missions can only be measured indirectly, which makes the scorecard less clear.
How then, to evaluate what elements are typical to a successful strategy? A number of academics have provided their suggestions for general criteria to answer the question. One of these being James Brian Quinn, who offers seven "critical elements" that he argues are common for all successful strategies, whether in business, government or warfare. Let's take a closer look at these criteria and evaluate the USCG Arctic Strategy in light of them.
The first criterion is clear, decisive objectives. By clarity Quinn means that the objectives be clearly understood, attainable and that they provide continuity and cohesion for tactical choices. Decisiveness means that achieving them ensures continued viability and vitality of the organization vis-à-vis its opponents. As mentioned in the introduction, the USCG Arctic Strategy includes three strategic objectives, which are divided into ten sub-objectives, which then are subdivided into altogether 40 sub-sub-objectives and in one case even into further sub-sub-sub-objectives. A detailed review of each of these is way beyond the scope of this report, but we can take a closer look at a descriptive example.
• Strategic objective: Improving Awareness
o Sub-objective: Ensure Effective Coordination and Information Sharing
Sub-sub-objective: Advocate for the establishment of an interagency Arctic Fusion Center, pending resources or funding, that promotes cooperation and coordination, and employs joint, interagency, and international capabilities to enable sustainable development and environmental protection.
In the example above the Strategic Objective is to improve awareness. By itself it does not meet the Quinn requirement of clarity. Improve and awareness both are big words with ambiguous content. Their exact definition depends on the observer. The sub-objective in this case is to ensure effective coordination and information sharing, which also escapes the strict requirement of clarity. Both the strategic objective and the sub-objective do conform with the requirement of providing continuity and cohesion for tactical choices, but because of their ambiguity they cannot be clearly understood or attainable. However, the strategic objectives and their sub-objectives in the Arctic Strategy are not meant to be clear and actionable per se, but rather to serve as umbrellas for more specific objectives. Only the sub-sub-objective here provides the full scope of clarity Quinn calls for. One either does or does not advocate for the establishment of an Arctic Fusion Center. There is no ambiguity involved. Of course a different question is how much resources and effort are allocated to this aim.
A definite assessment on the decisivness of this particular objective would require further analysis on other actors ("opponents") of the USCG in the arctic, which is beyond the scope of this report. However, based on a quick-look analysis it can be said that improving awareness in the Arctic does go a long way, in Quinn's terms, towards ensuring the future viablity and vitality of the USCG in the region. To sum up: the USCG Arctic Strategy would seem to comply with the criterion on clear and decisive objectives.
The second Quinn criterion is maintaining the initiative. By initiative Quinn refers to the proactive or reactive posture of the strategy. According to Quinn, reactive posture breeds unrest and lowers the morale of an organization, whereas proactivity preserves the freedom of action and enhances commitment among other things. While this might be all well and true for private companies, the case is not so clear for public organizations. Boyne and Walker (2004) argue that in fact a reactive strategy could be a source of strength for a public sector organization. This is because public organizations are rarely expected to be proactively conquering ground from their "competitors" (i.e. other public entities), but rather to only react to external (policy and environmental) changes.
The USCG Arctic Strategy is a response to external factors. As the document itself describes, the U.S. Arctic policy is outlined in documents like National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25. The USCG Arctic Strategy is a natural continuation of these higher level directives. Also, it is made clear in the Arctic Strategy that the USCG is in no way to expanding its mandate, but only reconfirming that the pre-existing mandate stands as it is also in the Arctic region. Therefore, it cannot be said that by drafting an Arctic Strategy the USCG is in any way grasping the initiative, but rather reacting to external policy changes. This makes the USCG Arctic Strategy reactive, as is the case with majority of public organizations' strategies according to Boyne and Walker. However, it does not necessarily mean that adopting the Arctic Strategy breeds unrest or lowers morale in the USCG organization. Rather, being reactive is a natural state of existence for public organizations.
The third Quinn criterion is concentration of superior power in time and place, in order to be decisive and best in critical dimensions in relation to opponents. Again, barring further research the USCG's strategic "opponents" in the Arctic (these could potentially be the other Arctic nations or other major powers); only limited statements can be made on the sufficiency of power concentration. Nor does the Arctic Strategy give any specific provisions about the allocation of USCG resources in the future. The Strategy does discuss improving awareness as well as increasing presence in the region, which implies that force concentration has been one of the considerations in making the strategy. Whether this concentration constitutes as being decisive in relation to other actors is left open for further research.
Quinn's fourth critical strategy element is flexibility, which means that the strategy makes provisions for strategic reserves and maneuverability as opposed to fixed commitment of resources. Under the strategic objective Improving Awareness, there is a sub-objective Achieve Effective Presence that probably best embodies the USCG position on resource allocation in the Arctic. It contains phrases like:
"…seek an adaptable mix of cutters, boats, aircraft…, and shore infrastructure to enable effective seasonal operations."
"Maintain a scalable presence commensurate with risks posed by increasing activity."
"Proceed with a risk-based phased approach to resourcing…"
The quotations above indicate the USCG's intent of refraining from reinforcing permanent presence in the Arctic, and instead opting for a scalable, adaptable and phased approach in relation to operational requirements. The Arctic Strategy can thus be described as flexible in line with Quinn's requirements.
Fifth on Quinn's list of criteria for effective strategy is coordinated and committed leadership, which calls for the nomination of a committed leader for each of the major goals in the strategy. The USCG Arctic Strategy does not comply with this criterion. Even though the objectives are clearly stated, no particular leaders are assigned to implement these objectives. However, it can be questioned whether the assignment of leaders is more the matter of an implementation plan than that of a strategy. This view is more in line with Grant's (2012) definition, where strategy is more like a unifying theme and guidelines, rather than a plan. Moreover, the USCG Arctic Strategy specifically mentions not being an implementation plan. It is highly likely that specific responsibilities were deliberately left out of the strategy, to be included in an implementation plan.
Sixth on Quinn's list is surprise, which means the use of speed, secrecy and intelligence to attack unprepared opponents. This is another criterion where Quinn might be a little off the mark in regards to public organizations. As is the case with the USCG, strategies of public organizations are very often public documents, which dispenses with the element of secrecy from the outset. Also if one's mission is to e.g. improve marine safety it does not make sense to try to somehow outpace "opponents", whoever they might be. As for the military elements of the USCG's mission, opponents might well be recognized, but dealing with those opponents is outside the scope of the Arctic Strategy.
The last element on Quinn's list is security. It is a wide concept ranging from securing vital operating points and resource bases, effective use of intelligence, logistics support and the effective use of coalitions. Of the aforementioned elements intelligence is best covered by the Arctic Strategy. Basically the whole strategic objective of improving awareness discusses the need for increased information and intelligence regarding every aspect of the Arctic. The use of coalitions to achieve goals is also well covered by the strategy. The third strategic objective, broadening partnerships, discusses building, reinforcing and utilizing coalitions on local, regional, national and international levels. Logistics are mentioned in the strategy only in reference to the challenges posed by extreme distances, extreme weather and scarcity of physical infrastructure. Here again, considering the nature of the document, it can be argued that issues like logistic support are probably better suited to be included in the implementation plan, rather than the strategy itself. The same is true for securing vital operating points and resource bases.
After reviewing the USCG Arctic Strategy in light of Quinn's criteria and contrasting some of his views with opinions of other strategy academics it can be concluded that the strategy and the criteria are mostly in line with each other. This means that the Arctic Strategy mostly complies with Quinn's criteria and where it does not it is most likely due to a conscious decision. These decisions have been made to keep the nature of the document clear as a strategy and not an implementation plan. It is also possible that some balancing has been made between the dual roles of the USCG as a public, yet military organization. On one hand public organizations are required to be governed with transparency and on the other the military role brings requirements for operational security.
3. Implementation aspects of the strategy
The strategic objectives in the USCG Arctic Strategy are divided into over 40 distinct sub-objectives. Planning the actions, resources and budgetary implications for the implementation of such a large number of objectives in accordance with the tasking of this report would require significant prior knowledge of the USCG organization or at least extensive rights to access all the relevant information within the organization - and a lot of time. Therefore, drafting an actual implementation plan for the Arctic Strategy is ruled out. Instead we will take a look at a single exemplary sub-objective and investigate some of its implementation aspects.
Under the strategic objective of improving awareness, there is a sub-objective: Achieve Effective Presence. It is further divided into eight sub-sub-objectives that mainly address monitoring developments in the Arctic and maintaining a scalable presence commensurate with these developments. Interestingly, the strategy talks only about maintaining presence, whereas some might argue that the USCG does not have much of a presence in the Arctic at the moment. There is not much from which to scale up either. The USCG does not have a permanent manned presence in the Arctic, although it has had a sustained seasonal presence since 2007 when it first launched operation Arctic Shield. It is an annual USCG operation in the framework of which surface and air assets are deployed in the Arctic for the summer season.
Sustained, however, is not the same as permanent. It could be argued that even if only for PR (public relations) reasons (in order to enforce its claim as an Arctic nation), the United States should maintain a permanent manned presence in the Arctic and it need not take up a lot of resources. An excellent example of this is Denmark's Sirius Sled Patrol. It is a small but highly prestigious special forces detachment that patrols the icy Greenland wilderness with dog sleds. In a similar fashion, the USCG could establish a permanent Forward Operating Base in Barrow, AK with a rotating cadre of special forces operators. These operators would be tasked to show the American flag in the Arctic, conduct long-range-reconnaissance and gather human intelligence (or call it information) from the native communities. In addition to providing useful intelligence, this approach would enable the U.S. to have a permanent presence in the Arctic with all the pertinent media attention and with minuscule budget implications.
If we are seriously talking about an effective and scalable presence in the Arctic, as the USCG Arctic Strategy does, we are inevitably talking about icebreakers. No other type of unit will bring the same year-round, all-weather capability to respond to a wide range of CG missions. In addition to just breaking ice and assisting merchant vessels in need, an icebreaker is also a mobile air station (rotary-wing, UAV), mothership for smaller surface assets (patrol boats, hovercraft, snowmobiles, etc.), C4ISR platform, weapons platform, spill response vessel, rescue tug, hospital, platform for scientific research and multiple other functions. It is clear that for Arctic conditions an icebreaker is the tool of choice. The USCG currently only has one heavy and one medium icebreaker in its operational fleet, with tentative plans for building another heavy. To be true to the Arctic Strategy's word about scalable presence more would be needed. In comparison, Russia currently operates around 40 icebreakers and even Finland has seven. Icebreakers are expensive, but the exact budget implications are debatable. The U.S. government has 800-1400M$ (600-1000M€) budgeted for the icebreaker acquisition, whereas the Finnish government has budgeted 125M€ for a roughly commensurate construction.
The conclusion is that options for the implementation of even a single sub-objective of the USCG Arctic Strategy are numerous. Two alternatives from the opposite ends of the cost spectrum are presented above. Considering the issue from the cost-impact perspective, the first option is recommended. It is assessed that by establishing a permanent Arctic Patrol, the USCG would gain useful intelligence and considerable PR-value with very limited investment.
4. Conclusions and recommendations
This report offered a sneak peek into the USCG Arctic Strategy and its evaluation and implementation aspects. A thorough evaluation, let alone implementation considerations would be better suited for a Master's (if not a doctoral) dissertation. This is to say that I did not get very deep or wide in this limited report. As for evaluation, I was only able to put the strategy through one set of evaluation criteria. I found Quinn's critical elements suitable for the purpose as it was very clear and straightforward, readily applicable and not requiring extensive background work. In retrospect, it served its purpose reasonably well, offering some insights into the workings of the Arctic Strategy. However, despite of what Quinn himself claims, his criteria seems to be better tuned for the private sector, leaving some of the criteria wanting when applied to public sector strategy. For example, on several occasions Quinn refers to opponents in relation to which the dimensions of the strategy are to be viewed. But for public organizations that operate according to laws and regulations in their own statutory bracket, it is often unclear who these opponents might be.
To take the strategy evaluation further, the next steps would have been to look at the strategy through different sets of criteria in order to draw a clearer profile of the document and possibly identify strengths and weaknesses. It also would have been interesting to look at other USCG strategies or similar strategies of other Coast Guard authorities and cross compare in order to see how the Arctic Strategy stands among its peers. Another path of further research would have been discussion on the strategic fit .
A treasure chest for further research is the implementation of the Arctic Strategy. As noted in chapter 3, to assess the implementation thoroughly would require significant resources in regards to access to (classified) information as well as time. Due to these limitations, only a tiny fraction of the ground could be covered with this report. However, even scratching the surface was interesting. An organization with resources as substantial as those of the USCG's obviously has a wide selection of alternatives at its disposal to pursue its strategic objectives. With a freewheeling research method, with only loose regard to any budgetary constraints it is extremely interesting to try to plan how those resources would best be put into effect to fulfill the strategic objectives. Even with only unclassified information at one's disposal this could be taken into much further detail.
One interesting aspect of the objectives set in the Arctic Strategy was the lack of any prioritization. Because of the large number of objectives, this almost amounts to the strategy perceivably lacking focus. Are all the objectives equally important then? It is safer to guess not. Therefore the logical assumption is that prioritization has been left for the implementation plan. It is debatable whether this has been the right decision. The answer presumably depends on how well the actual implementation plan (or implementation instructions in any form) are disseminated, tasked and supervised. If this is not done properly the organization's lower level leaders might be left wondering which way to go exactly. Therefore, it might be advisable to include a clear prioritization of tasks in the strategy document itself, which is widely promulgated. This would ensure a readily available buttress for operational and tactical level decisions at all times - one of the key incentives for making a strategy in the first place.
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